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I. Introduction 
“The market” is not a natural or organic entity. Markets cannot and do not exist apart 
from the state. In any modern, complex economy, transactions require conventions and laws to 
be successfully and reliably consummated. Even if we aspired to a completely contractually 
governed economy, questions of enforcement and interpretation of such contracts would arise. 
Thus the market is always a product of extensive state action.  
A so-called market economy requires property rights and tort law that are defined and 
enforced through the coercive mechanisms of the state. Contemporary capitalist or neoliberal 
social orders are dependent not only on common law doctrines such as trespass, alienability of 
property, and negligence but also on laws concerning copyright, patent, trademark, and corporate 
governance and the management of monetary policy by the Federal Reserve. Administrative 
agencies govern entire sectors of the economy. In short, the production and distribution of wealth 
are the result of conscious political decisions by the state, not preordained outcomes (Hale 1952, 
McCluskey 2012). 
Sadly, these basic points are frequently forgotten among both policymakers and 
practicing lawyers. Some aspects of law are treated as natural and unquestionable (e.g., tort and 
contract), while others are persistently painted as a statist incursion into Edenic laissez-faire 
(e.g., labor law and consumer protections). Even more troublingly, certain areas of law have 
come to not merely reflect, but embody, this one-sidedness. American antitrust law, in particular, 
has been used to undermine the power of professionals and associations of workers, even as 
contemporary antitrust authorities treat some of the most powerful firms ever to exist—and their 
own collusion against workers—with kid gloves (Pasquale 2010b, Whitney 2015). 
This bias in antitrust law reflects a larger cultural tilt in the United States toward 
consumer interests, and away from those producers (or, at least, the interests of productive 
workers at firms, as opposed to rentiers and capital generally) (Whitman 2007).1 Chicago School 
teachings have made an esoteric, mathematically defined account of “consumer welfare” the 
defining inquiry in antitrust. It is troubling enough that crabbed interpretations of monopolization 
and merger doctrine have acted as a shield to permit extraordinary levels of concentration in 
                                                          
1 Note, however, that there is no necessary tension between the interests of labor and consumers 
along several axes. For example, consumers prefer well-trained doctors, plumbers, et al., and 
those laborers who are well-trained do not want to face unfair competition from fly-by-night 
operators who have not sufficiently invested in the skills necessary to do these jobs well.  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2881732 
2 
 
major U.S. industries (Economist 2016, Pasquale 2013b). On top of this deferential posture 
toward large businesses, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Department of Justice (DOJ) 
use antitrust law as a sword, to challenge professions and worker associations that go too far in 
establishing standards of fair conduct, stable employment, and quality service in their fields. 
 Even as these initiatives, aimed at labor ranging from dentistry to ice skating coaching, 
may sometimes deter anticompetitive activity with no benefit to the economy as a whole, they 
can stifle beneficial collection action by workers. They signal a general disapproval of workers 
acting in concert and may undermine one of the few tools of self-assertion that workers can now 
brandish against powerful firms (ranging from digital labor platforms, like Uber or Amazon’s 
mTurk, to an increasingly concentrated health care industry). Most problematically, present 
antitrust doctrine does not take into account the societal value of occupational licensure or 
professional standards. Instead, it reflects mainstream economics’ bias against occupational 
licensure and a more general belief that government is the principal obstacle to competitive 
markets (Vaheesan 2015). 
 This article exposes weaknesses in the mainstream case against occupational licensure 
and worker self-organization (Part II). Sadly, antitrust law has failed to grapple with the thin 
empirical case against occupational self-governance and self-assertion (Part III). Therefore, it is 
essential for antitrust law to evolve toward a new position of respect for and openness to 
democratic governance within professions and occupations themselves, and laws recognizing 
that self-governance (Part IV).  
II. The Uneasy Case Against Occupational Licensure 
 During the trentes glorieuses, labor’s share of income relative to capital increased in the 
United States, thanks to favorable terms of globalization and legal protections for both unions 
and professions, among other factors (Piketty 2014). Consumer protection and disclosure laws 
also complicated the lives of firm managers. These progressive measures proved vulnerable to 
attack, however. Just as the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 marked a backlash against labor’s gains in 
the 1930s, the 1970s would see a variety of efforts to roll back what was perceived as a 
regulatory juggernaut of the 1960s. 
The Powell Memo outlined a number of initiatives to combat what its author perceived as 
undue liberal influence in universities, labor movements, and civil society generally (Powell 
1971). Regulators also came under attack. Those suspicious of the administrative state offered 
critical perspectives on the motives and results of licensing boards that controlled access to 
certain types of jobs. Walter Gellhorn complained that: 
occupational licensing has typically brought higher status for the producer of services at 
the price of higher costs to the consumer; it has reduced competition; it has narrowed 
opportunity for aspiring youth by increasing the costs of entry into a desired occupational 
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career; it has artificially segmented skills so that needed services, like health care, are 
increasingly difficult to supply economically; it has fostered the view that unethical 
practices will prevail unless those entrenched in a profession are assured of high incomes; 
and it has caused a proliferation of official administrative bodies, most of them staffed by 
persons drawn from and devoted to furthering the interests of the licensed occupations 
themselves (Gellhorn 1976). 
Gellhorn’s laundry list of objections later blossomed into think tank position papers and 
economic research. The American Enterprise Institute now laments the “terrible economic 
burden of occupational licensing.” (Pethokoukis 2014). Technocratic liberals join the dirge, and 
often put the dismantling of many occupational licensure requirements at the very top of a 
proposed bipartisan agenda to promote economic growth (along with cuts to entitlements and 
health care spending). 
 A rough typology of complaints against occupational licensure would include the 
following: it raises prices for consumers without commensurate increases in quality, and blocks 
out would-be competitors who cannot or will not undergo requisite training and tests. However, 
each of these objections is not sufficiently theorized, justified, or empirically grounded to 
support the types of interventions now routinely pursued by the Federal Trade Commission and 
Department of Justice. Commentators all too often extrapolate from horror stories to make 
claims about the entirety of licensing, peddling anecdata disconnected from the complex and 
variegated reality of contemporary labor practices. 
A. Price and Quality 
In the basic case against occupational licensure, the focus is on the higher prices arising 
from these regulations. There is a presumption that the price increase in, say, medical or legal 
services, due to the training and testing of licensed professionals in such fields, is not worth the 
wedge of price increase attributable to the cost of such training and testing. But there is little 
awareness of the real potential for consumers to capture that wedge of price. For example, if 
training requirements for nurses declined, perhaps hospitals would pay them lower starting 
salaries because they would not be burdened by such high student loan payments. But it is by no 
means clear that patients would see their bills fall. Instead, managers and shareholders may 
simply pocket the reduced wage—resulting in a hat trick of declining quality of labor, rising 
inequality, and less resources for the types of professional schools whose research advances 
nursing practice. 
 A more advanced version of the “higher-price-without-greater-quality” case depends on 
the rise of big data and forms of popular assessment to empower consumers to make their own 
judgments as to price/quality tradeoffs. Regina Herzlinger proposes ratings for drugs, rather than 
FDA approval or nonapproval decisions; a similar regime could rate doctors or lawyers, 
displacing extant licensing of such professionals. (Pasquale 2013a, Pasquale 2010c). According 
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to the usual economic logic, such tiered rating (rather than all-or-nothing licensure) of medical 
and legal professionals would expand access in both fields. 
However, such a perspective ignores the predictable costs of terrible providers. 
Moreover, it is an open invitation to fraud and abuse: there is widespread public funding for 
medicine, or contingent or state funding for legal services. The United States has developed 
several redistributive mechanisms to fund health care, ranging from the Medicare payroll tax to 
general funds derived from progressive income taxation. Fly-by-night operations can easily take 
advantage of such funds. It is very easy to game rating and ranking systems.  
There is also a question concerning how providers would earn their first star ratings or 
other indicia of quality. Perhaps those looking for experience would be a cheap option for the 
poor and disadvantaged. But creating such second-rate options for the poor undermines the 
unitary standard of care now underwritten by communal funding sources. Even if tiering and 
low-cost options would reduce the cost of care in many instances, there is no guarantee that this 
reduced cost will actually increase the real incomes of poor or middle class persons. Instead, it 
may simply result in reduced subsidies for health care from employers, or reduced state support. 
Moreover, those who would undermine extant institutions of medical or legal training rarely 
account for the value of the research generated by such institutions. 
Opponents of occupational licensure have an unfortunate tendency to treat the most 
marginal or extreme cases of inappropriate or excessive licensing requirements, as paradigmatic 
of the entire field. Parades of horribles quickly emerge: S. David Young complains about 
licensure of “falconers, ferret breeders, and palm readers” (Young 2002); Gellhorn marveled at 
the need to license “beekeepers and taxidermists” (Gellhorn 1976); cosmetologists and florists 
are a frequent go-to example for libertarian litigators (Vong v. Aune 2014, Slivinski 2015). We 
obviously cannot comprehensively demonstrate the wisdom of training requirements in each of 
these diverse areas of human occupation (though at least in the case of beekeepers, the risk of 
disastrous mismanagement of stinging insects suggests some regulation is wise). But they are 
scarcely reflective of the hundreds of occupations now licensed by some jurisdiction in the 
United States (and certainly not of the 65 occupations required to be licensed in all 50 states). 
Reflexive incredulity toward licensing requirements in certain fields is presumptuous, 
often reflecting an elitist, anti-worker outlook. It is also frequently hypocritical: the same 
commentators who would generalize from a critique of ferret breeder training to a deregulatory 
labor policy in general, would impose evidentiary strictures akin to the Data Quality Act on 
regulators before they expanded the scope of their authority. We believe that critics should 
demonstrate a Burkean humility before upsetting arrangements that have long governed these 
fields. It is easy to peer into any given occupation from the outside and exclaim, “what an easy 
job! Why on earth is a license required to do that?” It is harder to interview practitioners in the 
field and grasp the range of tasks their training may prepare them to undertake. To its credit, the 
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White House report on occupational licensure does occasionally cite authors who complete such 
studies, and find positive effects from licensure. But such documents rarely consider the full 
implications of the complexity of the licensure landscape. 
B. Restrictions on Entry  
Once one moves beyond the “easy cases” of libertarian outrage at licensure, the 
uneasiness of the wholesale case against licensure becomes clear. For example, many 
occupations govern decisions that have sizeable and long-term consequences for those who do 
not directly engage in the economic transaction giving rise to the decision. For example, a thrifty 
apartment owner may find an unlicensed plumber to install pipes. If the pipes later leak thanks to 
the cheap plumber’s lack of expertise, it is not merely the apartment owner who suffers—
neighbors and the entire building may be stricken with mold, structural damage, or worse. 
Similarly, granting prescribing authority to unlicensed medical professionals may create cheap 
options for the uninsured—but increases risks of “pill mills” and other accoutrements of opioid 
epidemics. 
Opponents of occupational licensing also rarely acknowledge that many professions do 
not require enough training before permitting relatively young and inexperienced individuals to 
take on enormous responsibility. One criminal justice expert argues that the current crisis of 
police shootings would be a far less widespread problem if officers had better training (Haberfeld 
2016). Robert Kuttner has argued that elder care in the US is, at present, abysmal in many 
nursing homes—and that more professionalized home health aides would provide much better 
care (Kuttner 2008). Tragically, extant licensing laws are all too often underenforced even in 
very sensitive areas. Over a 10-year period, there were 43 deaths in unlicensed Virginia day care 
facilities (Falls & Brittain 2014). The extreme vulnerabilities of ordinary citizens in each of these 
all-too-human experiences—being arrested, or being cared for during old or very young age—
commend more regulation of personnel in these fields, not less. 
Excess consumerism also skews scholarly perspectives here. While the harms of 
purchasing flowers from an unlicensed florist are not easy to fathom, consumer protection is not 
the sole goal or benefit from occupational licensing. A decision by the state to assure certain 
standards of quality in the provision of services like these is not entirely different in kind from a 
decision to decree a minimum wage, or mandate “closed shops” as a way to promote unions. 
Each regulation necessarily stops certain kinds of competition and shrinks a market relative to a 
less regulated benchmark.  
Occupational licensing establishes what Eliot Freidson called “market shelters.” 
(Freidson 1986). With these market shelters limiting entry, employers cannot draw on a large 
“reserve army” of unemployed individuals. By conferring greater bargaining power on workers, 
occupational regulations can raise wages and promote more stable employment. As history and 
more recent experience has shown, unfettered competition between workers in labor markets can 
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be harmful. It can lead to below-subsistence level wages and unstable employment arrangements 
that harm individual workers, families, and entire communities. As with unionization and 
minimum wage laws, occupational licensing can grant workers greater power vis-à-vis 
employers and thereby has the potential to enhance the welfare of workers. It is no surprise that, 
as unionization rates have declined in the United States, the percentage of the workforce seeking 
licensure has increased. 
III. The Existing Antitrust Paradigm Is Not Capable of Accurately or Fairly Evaluating 
Occupational and Professional Regulations  
While antitrust law has informed and inspired the intellectual and legal attacks on 
occupational licensing (Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar 1975, Edlin & Haw 2014), the current 
intellectual frame of antitrust cannot account for the myriad objectives of occupational 
regulations. Antitrust law today seeks to promote a very particular and arcane form of 
efficiency—allocative efficiency. This goal seeks to minimize the so-called deadweight loss 
from non-competitive pricing. The efficiency framework is untethered from the goals that 
Congress expressed when it enacted the antitrust laws. Unlike the vision expressed by the 
drafters of the Sherman, Clayton, and Federal Trade Commission Acts, antitrust’s present 
efficiency paradigm disregards power dynamics in the economy and society (Orbach 2013). The 
neoclassical model omits the critical role of state institutions in enabling market activity in the 
first place and assumes a perfectly competitive marketplace that does not exist outside textbooks. 
Even from a strictly consumerist perspective, the efficiency model does not protect the full range 
of consumer interests and prizes short-term price competition over other considerations such as 
quality and safety (Pasquale 2013c, Pasquale 2006). Due to their narrow focus, in particular on 
short-term consumer prices, the efficiency-minded antitrust agencies have launched misguided 
attacks on occupational licensing. 
A. The Current Antitrust Framework Fails to Account for the Pluralistic Goals of 
Occupational and Professional Regulations 
Notwithstanding some intellectual disagreements at the margins, the extant antitrust 
regime prizes economic efficiency and treats other objectives as irrelevant. This technical 
concept of economic efficiency is derived from the neoclassical model and built on a pyramid of 
deductive reasoning. It is centered on a person’s willingness and ability to pay for something. It 
does not consider a person’s needs apart from his or her ability to acquire these needs. For 
example, an ill person’s desire to obtain lifesaving health care is not accorded importance unless 
she has the means to purchase health care.  
The principal or exclusive social harm under this framework is so-called deadweight loss 
in which some mutually beneficial market transactions do not occur due to some institutional 
impediment. Concerns about distribution and even longer-term economic efficiency are either 
treated as secondary or dismissed. So-called non-economic desires, such as preserving a 
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particular industrial structure, maintaining the viability of local businesses, and protecting the 
living standards of workers, are deemed outside the scope of antitrust law. 
The efficiency fixation does not reflect the Congressional goals of the antitrust laws. The 
sponsors of the antitrust laws had a broad vision for the new laws and sought to curtail 
concentrated private power and its many ill effects. Economists had not even invented the 
concept of economic efficiency when Congress passed the principal antitrust statutes in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Carstensen 1983). 
Even leaving aside the legislative histories of the antitrust laws, the case for sacrificing 
popular social goals in the name of an arcane definition of efficiency is unpersuasive. Will 
Davies has acidly remarked on the extreme manipulability of the type of “aggregative” analysis 
characteristic of contemporary antitrust economics (Davies 2014). The concept of allocative 
efficiency prioritizes wealth maximization, leaving redistribution to be pursued later, if at all, via 
taxes and transfers (Kaplow & Shavell 2000). This work largely ignores or discounts the 
possibility that unequal wealth attained under “optimal” substantive legal rules may be devoted 
to blocking political processes necessary to redistribute it (Kaplow & Shavell 1994). 
The goals of public policy are not cast in stone nor can they be removed from the realm 
of politics. Rather, they are contestable. Despite the claims of its proponents, efficiency is not a 
value-neutral concept. Efficiency maximization is laden with implicit political judgments on the 
role of the state, the existing distribution of wealth, and human behavior. Specifically, it demands 
that the state vigorously enforces rights of property and contracts and assumes that the existing 
distribution of wealth is somehow just or at least the result of neutral processes and that human 
behavior is motivated primarily or exclusively by self-interest (Flynn 1988). On the whole, the 
efficiency ideology tilts heavily in a conservative direction and is loath to upset the status quo 
(Hovenkamp 1985). 
Astonishingly to a non-specialist observer, objectives such as consumer protection and 
employment stability play little to no role in antitrust case law focused on the professions and 
associations of workers. As one law casebook has noted: 
There has long been a widespread agreement in the case law that antitrust inquiries 
should focus exclusively on competitive effects and should not take into account 
purported non-economic benefits of collective activities such as advancing social policies 
or even protecting public safety. This self-imposed boundary is based on the judiciary’s 
skepticism about its competence to balance disparate social policies and the judgment 
that such concerns are more appropriately addressed to the legislature. Importantly, then, 
under Section One of the Sherman Act, courts will not consider justifications other than 
those asserting that a practice, on balance, promotes competition. . . . [This] constraint is 
in obvious tension with justifications by professionals that their collective activities have 
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the purpose of advancing the quality of patient care (Furrow et al. 2013, citing National 
Society of Professional Engineers v. United States 1978). 
While plausible and even an admirable exercise of restraint on the surface, this account ignores 
political realities.  The “judiciary’s skepticism about its competence to balance disparate social 
policies” makes sense in the context of a concerned and democratically responsive Congress 
capable of responding flexibly to grant exemptions in cases where it judges public safety 
rationales to have merit. In a climate of nearly two decades of intensifying gridlock, however, it 
is a recipe for advantaging those able to take advantage of extant antitrust exemptions (like the 
Noerr-Pennington doctrine and other broad conceptions of protected “speech”) to further 
entrench their own power relative to those less advantageously positioned (Eastern Railroad 
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. 1961, United Mine Workers v. Pennington 
1965. See also Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n 2010).   
While some economists may dismiss public safety, industrial policy, or job stability as 
“illegitimate” goals according to their dogma, this assertion reflects an intellectual narrowness 
and blindness to developments in American society.  Properly interpreted, antitrust law would 
empower courts to consider criteria of well-being besides short-term wealth maximization—
particularly when so much of that wealth has accrued to the top one percent of households 
(Pasquale 2010a, Pasquale 2014).  
Moreover, antitrust law need not be entirely focused on consumer welfare, especially 
given changes in the balance of power between very large firms and workers. Over the past two 
generations, tens of millions of American have experienced stagnant wages and precarious 
employment. In this context, concerns about jobs and income are entirely valid and have become 
central to political debates. In the absence of stable, well-paying jobs, Americans are 
increasingly facing lives of material deprivation and chronic uncertainty. These afflictions are 
bad enough on their own, but also threaten dire macroeconomic consequences, as individuals 
subject to constant fear of losing a livelihood resist making rational investments in education or 
the types of consumption they would normally enjoy. For mainstream economists and antitrust 
lawyers to condemn occupational licensing on the grounds that it raises wages and generally 
helps workers is to elevate the preferences of one class of technocrats over democratic choices. 
B. The Current Antitrust Framework Fails to Consider Power in the U.S. Political 
Economy 
The efficiency model at the heart of current antitrust law also ignores power dynamics in 
American society in two critical ways. First, it submerges and naturalizes the essential role for 
state institutions in establishing and maintaining a market economy. Second, it relies on a model 
of perfect competition that disregards the power disparities that characterize the U.S. economy 
and have characterized it for centuries. 
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The neoclassical model at the heart of antitrust law fails to acknowledge the important 
role of the state and public institutions in allowing markets to emerge and flourish. The capitalist 
economy is a state-ordered system. The neoclassical model and the associated language of “free 
markets” and “government intervention” obscure this truth. The textbook model of “efficient 
markets” requires widespread state action (Hale 1952, McCluskey 2012). Yet, this model 
assumes away these forms of state action and submerges, for example, property and contract 
rights that enable market activity into the state of nature preceding government institutions. This 
premise leads to the widespread belief that the state somehow emerges after markets are already 
flourishing—either improving market outcomes on occasion according to one school of thought 
or only impeding market efficiency according to a rival camp. A belief in this model can produce 
claims that property rights are “natural,” but occupational licensing is an unjustified state 
imposition. 
In addition to naturalizing the performance of certain state functions, current antitrust law 
uses perfect competition as its intellectual starting point. Under this stylized model, no party—
consumer, firm or worker—has power to influence prices or other quantities in the market. 
Everyone sells a commodified good or service at the competitive price, no higher and no lower. 
This conception of the market is the successor to Adam Smith’s idealized view of a market in 
which all participants are equals and answer to no authority except the invisible hand of 
collective decisions by buyers and sellers. The model of perfect competition has been at the heart 
of many defenses of existing economic arrangements in the United States and capitalism 
generally.  
Even when monopoly or oligopoly cannot be denied, the defenders of efficiency have a 
readymade response. They assume that market entry is easy and so all markets are “contestable” 
by firms waiting on the sidelines. In this view, monopoly and oligopoly are fleeting phenomenon 
soon defeated by new firms pursuing profit opportunities (e.g., Easterbrook 1984). 
While this model is simple and appealing in imagining a system in which no single actor 
or even a group of actors exercises power over others, it is detached from contemporary political 
economy. Perfect competition is an ideal that is, for all intents and purposes, not seen in the U.S. 
economy. The example of perfect competition often cited in textbooks and by economists—
agriculture—is far from competitive, let alone perfectly competitive. Rather, a defining 
characteristic is the highly concentrated agricultural processing sector (Hendrickson & Heffernan 
2007), which can dictate the terms at which American farmers can sell their products. The 
assumptions of free entry and contestable markets are also convenient assumptions, rarely seen 
in practice. 
Most sectors of the economy are monopolistic or oligopolistic, with product 
differentiation being a defining characteristic of modern commerce. Sectors ranging from airlines 
to pharmaceuticals to telecom are dominated by a small number of corporations (Porter 2016). 
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Moreover, despite claims of new competition and openness in the economy, the technology 
sector appears to be the antithesis of vigorous competition. Five large platforms dominate this 
“new economy,” (Manjoo 2016) and two companies have a 70 percent share in the national 
broadband market (Farivar 2016). 
In this world of monopoly and oligopoly power, some actors have great power while 
others have very little. A monopoly provider of a service has great power over its consumers as 
well as entrants that could threaten its dominance. An employer in a one-company town has the 
power to dictate not only how much its workers make. In a true company town, the employer 
also determines how workers are paid (for example, scrip rather than dollars) and how they 
spend their earnings (for instance, company-owned stores are the only retailers that accept scrip). 
It does not require exaggeration to say that capital has a great deal of power in both its 
purchasing and selling decisions and that workers and consumers have comparatively little 
power. To gloss over the power disparity between monopolistic and oligopolistic corporations 
and individual workers and consumers is to elevate the barren formalism of microeconomics 
over social realities.  
The power of concentrated capital extends beyond the confines of the market sphere. The 
microeconomic concept of market power captures only one aspect of the power exercised by 
concentrated capital. Large corporations have the power to shape the long-term development of 
their industry by determining who gets to participate in their market and on what terms. They can 
also manipulate democratic politics, the media, and the ideology of a society. For example, they 
can fund trade associations, think tanks, and academics to influence the terms of popular debate 
and foster ideologies supportive of their interests (Kocieniewski 2013, Lipton & Williams 2016). 
Corporate power, understood in its entirety, implicates political economy and cannot be cabined 
to control over the price of one commodity at one point in time. 
Occupational and professional licensing regimes are established against the backdrop of 
extensive market-enabling state action and power disparities. They are not imposed on an 
anarchic or egalitarian marketplace. Rather, they are a layer of state action that structure markets, 
much like property and tort law. As with these common law fields, occupational and professional 
regulations shift legal entitlements and shape marketplace outcomes. They have the capacity to 
redress disparities in power. They can confer and amplify organizational force to atomized 
groups of workers. In doing so, they can create more equal—or at least less unequal—power 
relations between labor and capital. 
C. Antitrust Law's Intellectual Foundation and Analytical Framework Fail to Protect 
Consumers 
While the efficiency model can be reconciled to an extent with the consumer protection 
aspect of occupational licensing, it does not give consideration to the full range of consumer 
interests. Its horizon does not extend beyond the short term. The neoclassical paradigm, most 
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familiarly expressed in supply-and-demand diagrams, is a static view of a market. Per this 
understanding, short-term market failures are valid grounds for state “intervention.” Yet, markets 
do not exist at a single point in time. The present efficiency model fails to account for dynamic 
changes that can have far greater impact on consumers—for better or for worse—than static 
changes. In practice, the efficiency model can capture the static cost of a regulation but not its 
dynamic benefit. Antitrust law does have an analytical framework, the rule of reason, for 
balancing the benefits and costs of a particular public policy. Yet, because of its fixation on 
quantification, it is incapable of balancing the full range of benefits and costs. 
The efficiency paradigm does recognize the possibility of market failures that warrant 
state action and thereby does acknowledge a limited role for occupation and professional 
regulations. In the textbook model, asymmetric information is a defining characteristic of some 
markets, especially those for complex services. Consumers lack the sufficient information to 
make fully informed decisions. For example, due to information asymmetries, consumers may 
not be able to tell a reputable medical practitioner from a quack seeking to make easy money 
(Akerlof 1970). Beyond paying for worthless service, consumers may suffer grievous harm 
because they cannot distinguish capable from incapable practitioners. An unqualified 
cardiologist can inflict great harm on patients, including incapacitation and death. The efficiency 
frame of contemporary antitrust deems such asymmetric information between consumers and 
service providers to be a market failure that warrant public action. 
Licensing can correct for this asymmetric information between consumers and providers. 
It can establish impose educational and other training requirements for individuals seeking to 
offer a particular service. Occupational regulations screen market participants and ensure that 
only qualified professionals can legally serve the public. It establishes an entry barrier against 
incompetent and unqualified practitioners. Under such a licensing system, consumers are 
relieved of the burden of trying to distinguish competent practitioners from those who are not. 
Much like product standards, licensing rules can serve as a “market-stabilizing device . . . in 
industries characterized by complex or highly technical products, where product quality is 
otherwise difficult to ascertain.” (FTC 1983). 
While it supposedly protects consumer interests, the current antitrust framework protects 
consumers in a very limited way. The efficiency model does not account for dynamic benefits 
from regulations, occupational or otherwise. For example, occupational regulations can raise 
wages and draw more skilled and diligent individuals into a field over a longer time horizon 
(Shapiro 1986). This can translate to superior quality and enhanced public safety. In other words, 
occupational licensing can reduce price competition today in exchange for higher levels of 
quality and safety in the future. Because of its static orientation, however, the efficiency frame 
does not capture these dynamic benefits. Instead, the efficiency lens sees only the short-term loss 
of price competition. 
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Antitrust law’s rule of reason, superficially sophisticated, is not capable of evaluating the 
benefits and costs of occupational regulation. In theory, it should be able to identify and balance 
competing objectives and considerations. Yet, in practice, it cannot achieve this goal. As with 
other prevailing forms of cost-benefit analysis, the rule of reason is comparatively good at 
measuring short-term and quantifiable costs and benefits and deficient in or even incapable of 
measuring longer-term and more qualitative benefits and costs (Allensworth 2016). In antitrust 
cases against mergers or monopolies, the rule of reason means that the plaintiff loses unless it 
can show actual or likely short-term price effects from the defendant’s conduct (Stucke 2009). 
Dynamic and other more qualitative harms from, for example, a merger or monopoly are either 
discounted or disregarded. 
The defects of the rule of reason become apparent in the context of public interest 
regulation. The costs of public interest regulation, including those governing occupational and 
professional licensing, tend to be quantifiable and incurred in the short run, whereas the benefits 
are more qualitative and more likely to accrue over a longer time horizon.2 Applying a rule of 
reason framework often means emphasizing the costs and discounting or ignoring the benefits. In 
the context of occupational regulations, a restriction on entry into a particular profession can 
raise prices in the short term but also improve the quality of service in the longer term. Given its 
bias in favor of quantifiable items, the rule of reason is likely to identify and condemn the short-
term loss of price competition and overlook any offsetting improvements to service quality over 
the long term. In practice, the rule of reason is biased against policies that have static, short-run 
costs and dynamic, long-run benefits. When forced to choose between a benefit that is not 
quantifiable and a cost which is, the rule of reason champions the quantifiable and ignores the 
non-quantifiable. 
D. The Existing Antitrust Paradigm’s Narrow Lens Leads to Misguided Attacks on 
Occupational Licensing and Worker Collective Action 
The shift in antitrust philosophy from political economy to narrow microeconomics has 
brought occupational and professional regulations, as well as collective action by workers, into 
the enforcers’ cross-hairs. The efficiency paradigm has led to collusion becoming the primary 
focus of antitrust enforcement, especially public enforcement. Without drawing distinctions 
between labor and capital, the antitrust agencies have made policing collective action by workers 
a focus of their enforcement and competition advocacy efforts. In doing so, they have insisted on 
viewing occupational and professional licensing within the narrow lens of their efficiency 
framework, rather than a consideration of larger public policies. 
Under the efficiency framework, collusion has become the “supreme evil of antitrust.” 
(Verizon Communications v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko 2004). Conduct such as horizontal 
                                                          
2 For example, cost-benefit analysis in the environmental context generally discounts longer-term 
benefits (Driesen 2006; Kysar 2010). 
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price fixing between rivals is seen as almost always generating deadweight losses and no 
offsetting efficiency benefits. Today, collusion is subject to aggressive prosecution, with the 
Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division focusing much of its resources on the criminal 
prosecution of individual and companies involved in price fixing and bid rigging (First & Waller 
2013). As collusion has moved to the center of the enforcement agenda, other forms of 
anticompetitive behavior have receded in importance. In elevating collusion to the rank of most 
serious antitrust offense, the antitrust agencies have neglected historical concerns about the 
concentration of private power. Over the past several decades, they have made merger and 
monopoly cases a lower priority. For example, the Department of Justice filed just one 
monopolization suit between 2006 and 2015 (U.S. Dep. of Justice, Workload Statistics). 
With their collusion-centric enforcement philosophy and focus on eliminating restraints 
on horizontal price competition, the enforcement agencies, in particular the Federal Trade 
Commission, have made occupational and professional regulations a major priority (U.S. FTC 
2016, United States 2016). Regulation of the occupations and professions often involves 
restrictions on entry and the establishment of price floors and supervision requirements. Because 
these regulations are often instigated at the behest of practitioners and impede full price 
competition, the antitrust agencies have been active participants in the campaign against them. 
They have called for a retrenchment of occupational regulations and argued that they should be 
limited to measures that protect consumers.  
In addition to public advocacy against occupational regulations, the agencies have 
targeted private trade restraints among workers in their enforcement. They have brought 
enforcement actions against professional associations that adopted ethical codes and other rules 
that limited price competition among their members. In recent years, for instance, the FTC 
brought enforcement actions against professional associations representing music teachers and 
ice skating teachers for prohibiting their members from soliciting each other’s clients (In re 
Music Teachers Ass’n 2014, In re Professional Skaters Ass’n 2015). Such suits against 
professional associations are not new for the FTC. For the antitrust agencies, collusion is 
collusion and should be subject to similar punishments, whether practiced by middle class 
workers seeking to establish some features of a market shelter or by the world’s largest tech 
companies striving to suppress wages. Music and ice skating teachers who profit at the expense 
of parents of overachieving children may not be the most sympathetic defendants. The FTC, 
however, does not appear to restrict its activities to relatively privileged workers directly serving 
consumers. In fact, even collective action by workers to challenge powerful employers over low 
wages and unsafe working conditions is likely to draw the attention of the FTC (FTC v. Superior 
Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n 1990, Paul 2015). 
These advocacy and enforcement efforts are misguided because they insist on viewing 
professional and occupational licensing through the framework of allocative efficiency. This 
technocratic concept is the proper goal of neither the antitrust laws in particular nor public policy 
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in general. Occupational and professional regulations advance myriad goals. They can protect 
consumers in the short and long run and promote stable employment with livable wages. 
Antitrust enforcers, in joining the chorus against occupational and professional regulations 
disregard these other public policy aims and demand that legislators and regulators conform to 
their efficiency ideology. 
IV. How Antitrust Agencies and Courts Should Respect the Objectives of Occupational and 
Professional Regulations in the Near Term 
Notwithstanding the narrow and inadequate efficiency paradigm of contemporary 
antitrust law, the federal antitrust agencies and the courts can still respect the objectives for 
occupational and professional regulations and ensure sufficient policy space for them. They can 
take two steps to ensure that occupational regulations are less likely to be subject to antitrust 
interference. First, the DOJ and FTC, in exercising prosecutorial discretion, should recognize 
that labor is not just another “commodity.” Second, the agencies and the courts should maintain a 
state action immunity that gives states and municipalities freedom to enact and preserve 
occupational licensing without fear of antitrust liability.  
A. The Spirit of the Clayton Act’s Labor Exemption Should, At a Minimum, Inform 
the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion 
The federal antitrust agencies should accord much lower priority to policing occupational 
regulation than they currently do. The current efficiency framework is not up to the task of 
evaluating occupational licensing regimes, even from a strict consumerist perspective. The 
efficiency ideology can offer only a partial understanding of the purposes and effects of 
occupational regulations. At best, it can provide some protection for consumers. At worst, this 
paradigm simplistically condemns occupational regulations as “publicly-approved cartels” and 
ignores their social benefits.  
This exercise of prosecutorial discretion makes sense from a resource perspective. The 
agencies recognize that they cannot bring every case or opine on every matter that implicates 
competition policy. These capacity limitations are most acute during times of fiscal austerity, 
such as the present (Lipman 2013). In light of these constraints, the DOJ and FTC should place a 
much lower priority on policing occupational regulations and collective action by workers. These 
freed up resources can be devoted to areas that have been neglected in recent years and decades 
such as merger and monopolization matters. Even from a purely consumerist perspective, 
challenging an anticompetitive merger in food retailing or health insurance is sure to produce 
greater consumer savings than bringing a case against ice skating coaches for not soliciting each 
other’s students. 
A reduced focus on occupational regulation would promote the congressional spirit 
behind the Sherman and Clayton Acts. When the Sherman Act was being debated in 1890, a 
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recurring concern was that courts would apply it to labor unions and other worker collectives on 
the basis that this joint action represented a “restraint of trade.” The principal sponsors of the bill 
allayed this concern and stated it was aimed at capital, not labor (Paul 2016). Notwithstanding 
this understanding in Congress, the courts applied the Sherman Act to labor activities in the 
subsequent years (Loewe v. Lawlor 1908). Congress responded with the Clayton Act in 1914 and 
the Norris-La Guardia Act in 1935 to create space for collective labor activities (15 U.S.C. § 12). 
The Clayton Act’s labor exemption used expansive language, stating that “the labor of a human 
being is not a commodity or article of commerce.”  
A reduced focus on occupational regulation would further the original vision of the 
Sherman and Clayton Acts. Occupational regulations are, in part, intended to protect the interests 
of workers and promote higher wages and stable employment. Over the past century, the courts 
have construed the labor exemption narrowly and, in large measure, limited to the context of 
labor unions and collective bargaining rather than worker collective action more generally (29 
U.S.C. § 101). Yet, this narrow understanding is a holdover from a different era with different 
labor market institutions, a period when stable centralized workplaces were the norm. This type 
of workplace is in long-term decline, replaced by a “fissured workplace” with independent 
contractor status becoming a new norm (Weil 2014). A broad understanding of the labor 
exemption would acknowledge changes in the labor market and recognize that those who depend 
on their labor for a living are workers, notwithstanding legal formalities and labels. 
B. The State Action Immunity Should Not Be Made More Restrictive 
The courts should not make the test for the state action immunity more restrictive. This 
immunity provides states with the flexibility to advance important public policies without 
running afoul of the antitrust laws. In the context of occupational licensing, the state action 
doctrine gives states and municipalities the freedom to establish regulations to protect 
consumers, improve wages and employment, and advance other public objectives. 
The state action immunity reconciles the federal antitrust laws with state and local 
political authority. The Supreme Court has held that state action is immune from the antitrust 
laws. For instance, a state cannot be held liable for passing a law that restricts competition in a 
market (Parker v. Brown 1943). Private actors are entitled to the state action immunity if they 
can show that they are (1) acting pursuant to clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state 
policy, and (2) subject to active supervision by the state (Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. 
Midcal Aluminum, Inc. 1980). This doctrine represents a sensible balance between upholding the 
federal antitrust laws, respecting state and local policymaking powers, and protecting against the 
capture of these governmental units by private interests. 
The Supreme Court in North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC (2015) 
clarified the application of the state action doctrine to regulatory bodies composed of private 
actors. The Court held that if a state agency is “controlled by active market participants,” such as 
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the dentists in the case, it would have to be actively supervised by a state entity. The Court noted 
that an agency controlled by active market participants is similar to a private trade association, 
except that the former acts under the color of state authority. According to the Court, in the 
absence of the active supervision requirement, powerful private actors could use state power to 
advance their own interests, rather than a broader public interest or state policy. 
For state bodies controlled by active market participants, an important outstanding issue 
that the Court did not resolve what qualifies as “active supervision.” It stated that “day-to-day 
involvement in an agency’s operations or micromanagement of its every decision” is not 
required. It offered some guidance and stated that a supervising state actor “must review the 
substance of the anticompetitive decision . . . and have the power to veto or modify a particular 
decision.” Unrealized potential for review is not sufficient. 
To preserve occupational regulations, the active supervision requirement should not be 
made more restrictive. The Court’s current guidance for what active supervision should be 
preserved, rather than made more prescriptive. In a number of areas across the states, 
occupational licensing bodies are controlled by active market participants. This choice is logical 
because active market participants are likely to have the expertise to serve as competent 
regulators of their field. As the Supreme Court noted though, these arrangements raise the risk of 
private interests being elevated over public goals. The Supreme Court’s formulation of the active 
supervision requirement serves as reasonable check against this threat, without imposing onerous 
burdens on states.  
To insist on more robust state oversight would create risks for occupational licensing 
regimes, and may even undermine the stated purposes of the Court. States could be compelled to 
establish “day-to-day supervision” of agencies controlled by active market participants or to 
replace active market participants with full-time officials. Retaining full-time government 
employees to oversee or staff these agencies may open entities like medical boards to even more 
political interference. And it seems both unnecessary and unaffordable at a time of tight 
budgetary constraints at the state level. If the state action doctrine is interpreted to demand such 
changes in the context of agencies controlled by active market participants, states may be forced 





Technocrats have recently stepped up their attacks on occupational licensing regimes. 
They have criticized these regulations for raising consumer prices without providing sufficient 
offsetting health, safety, and other consumer benefits and for limiting entry into labor markets. 
These criticisms reflect an unduly narrow view of both consumer interests and the public 
interest. Evidence suggests that from a consumer protection angle many occupational licensing 
rules are too permissive and underenforced. Consumers appear to suffer serious harm, including 
grievous injury and death, because existing occupational licensing regimes are too weak. 
Moreover, occupational licensing is not intended to benefit consumers alone. By restricting 
entry, occupational and professional regulations establish market shelters that enhance the 
bargaining power of workers, raising wages and improving the welfare of workers. They 
function much as federal labor and minimum wage laws do and help establish floors on labor 
market standards. 
Although many critics of occupational licensing have applied its framework, antitrust 
law, as presently interpreted, is not capable of fairly or fully evaluating occupational regulations. 
Under the efficiency objective of contemporary antitrust, goals aside from short-term wealth 
maximization are trivialized. For example, distributional fairness, protection of workers, and 
preservation of a democratic political economy are seen as “illegitimate.” Notwithstanding the 
claims of its proponents, efficiency is neither apolitical nor value-free but rather conservative in 
orientation. Furthermore, the efficiency model assumes away power, disregarding the role of 
market-enabling state action and the supremacy of capital in modern society. Even from a 
consumerist view, the efficiency paradigm protects only a subset of consumer interests, 
principally short-term prices, and fails to fully consider other measures such as quality and 
safety. Rather than promote a broad understanding of the public good, efficiency-oriented 
antitrust authorities have launched misguided attacks on occupational licensing and worker 
collective action. 
 Federal antitrust authorities can still change course and not continue to demand that 
occupational regulations conform to their narrow efficiency objective. They can take two 
concrete steps to ensure political and policy space for occupational regulations. First, the DOJ 
and FTC should apply a broad interpretation of the statutory antitrust exemption for labor in 
exercising their prosecutorial and advocacy discretion. Second, they should preserve the existing 
interpretation of the state action immunity that preserves policy discretion for state and substate 
actors, including over the regulation of occupations. 
Antitrust authorities should take a sober second look at the big picture of capital-labor 
relations over the past 50 years. While the prerogatives and wealth of concentrated capital have 
grown by leaps and bounds over the past half century, the main institutions of coordinated 
labor—unions—have precipitously declined, particularly in the private sector. Productivity gains 
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have disproportionately benefitted the top 1%, while wages stagnate. In that environment, one 
might expect it a foregone conclusion that antitrust enforcement would focus on its classic role 
of controlling the power of massive firms—rather than contriving new doctrine to unravel 
labor’s belated and meager efforts at self-protection. Instead, antitrust authorities in both the 
Clinton and Obama administrations continued the Bush (père et fils) trend to shirk their 
responsibility to monitor and contain the monopolizing impulses of massive firms—especially in 
the technology and finance sectors (Khan & Vaheesan, 2017). This trend is particularly troubling 
given the mounting evidence that information markets are being systematically distorted by large 
firms (Patterson, 2016; Ezrachi & Stucke, 2016; Stucke & Grunes, 2016). 
Top economic officials in both the Obama and Trump administrations say that they want 
to assure workers good jobs at good wages. But the assertion rings hollow when they set out to 
undermine one of the key institutions offering some kind of stability in labor markets racked by 
precarity and disruption. The attack on occupational licensing is only a few steps removed from 
moves to undermine unions. If the Trump administration makes an assault on unionization a 
priority for its National Labor Relations Board, that might be a reversal of Democrats’ NLRB 
policy—but will also have to be seen as a continuation of technocratic Democrats’ anti-
protectionist approach to labor. Unions, professional associations, and licensure requirements are 
mutually supportive and reinforcing policies designed to give workers some autonomy and self-
determination in defining the terms of their employment. Undermining one tends to undermine 
the others. 
Occupational licensing is just as much a matter of politics as it is of economics. 
Especially given persistent bias and opacity in the “economic science” of merger analysis, 
antitrust loses little if any scientific validity once it concedes the dually politico-economic nature 
of competition policy (Eisinger and Elliott, 2016). In properly politico-economic questions, both 
the ends and the means are open to debate, not dictated by a technocratic quest for a perfected 
labor market (McCluskey, Pasquale, and Taub, 2016).  
 Admittedly, existing occupational regulations can and should be improved. For example, 
they sometimes impede the full participation of former prisoners and immigrants in American 
economic life. The critical point is that occupational licensing implicates multiple, and 
sometimes competing, public policy goals, including protecting consumers and enhancing the 
bargaining power of workers. Licensure—part consumer protection, part labor law—calls for 
legislative-type determinations that reflect a broad and multifaceted conception of the public 
interest, not limited by esoteric formulations of efficiency that have by now lost whatever patina 
of legitimacy they once had. Antitrust practitioners who insist on reducing every public policy 
decision to efficiency-enhancing or efficiency-reducing cannot account for the pluralistic 
objectives of occupational licensing in particular and public policy in general. Given its 
intellectual narrowness, the framework of contemporary antitrust law provides a warped view of 
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